The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 1

Belgium similarly built another array of forts along its border with Germany. The

mightiest fort was Fort d’Ében-Émael. Attempting to capture this fort by conventional means

was out of the question. Hence, the envisaged airborne landing on the supposedly

impregnable Fort d’Ében-Émael was a first in military history, and those weapons used to

disable the fortress’s main armaments were untried. An attacking force, though, needed to

spot the weak point of a concrete bunker. These weak points were openings such as doors,

air vents or apertures. Spotting them in the heat of battle and under constant fire was no

easy undertaking. Approaching these vulnerable areas, with the help of suppressing fire,

required the detection of ‘blind spots’, which might well be covered by mutually supporting

bunkers or openings in the same defending structure. Once a defence had been breached,

the attacking parties had to quickly to overcome internal defence mechanisms, as many of

the border fortresses had autonomous defensive sections.

The Allied Forces relied on a largely tightly-coupled form of defence, although with some

mobile forces. They could count on pre-planned engagements with the Germans.

Nevertheless, once their tightly coupled, fortified line of defence was broken, it quickly

became redundant. The unknown variables were where and when a breakthrough in their

lines would be attempted, and how quickly that gap could be plugged. Their rather static

defence had the advantage that they would encounter the enemy in a terrain they had

prepared for. Hence, any approach or attempt to break through a fortified position would be

countered by massive, pre-registered fire power from artillery and small arms fire from

(fortress)-infantry. In order to succeed, any attack on a fortified position would have to be

carried out with a force that outnumbered that of the defenders by an estimated three times

the number of infantry, six times the amount of artillery and twelve times the quantity of

ammunition.

The French and their Allies, from a defensive perspective, would face a more certain

environment than the Germans (see Figure 1.3). Relying on a largely immovable defensive

shield, they could pre-load their response and concentrate their pre-registered firepower as a

method of subduing an attacker:

The effects of fire are both physical and psychological. They create zones of death

where the troops undergo massive and shattering losses which render them incapable

of actions. Either the material is destroyed or the units are fragmented. (1936 French

Army regulations, quoted in Kiesling 1996, 137)

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