The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 1

A common picture in France. (BArch, n.d.)

Superior numbers. The military disposition of both armies slightly favoured the

French. The Allied Army could rely on a total of 136 divisions − 94 divisions, including 13

fortress divisions, plus an additional 22 Belgian and 9 British infantry divisions plus 1 Army

tank Brigade, and ten Dutch divisions. Hitler could muster 135 divisions, including ten

armoured divisions. In quality, the divisions varied on both sides. The Allies were in

possession of around 3,000 tanks that outgunned their German counterparts (2,700 tanks)

numerically and provided greater protection. France also excelled in the provision of artillery

pieces by a ratio of 3:2 ratio. Only in the air were the Allied Forces outclassed by the

German Air Force (Luftwaffe) .

Infantry. Numerically, in terms of mere numbers and quantities of divisions, men and

materials, the Allied Forces had a slight advantage over their German counterparts. On both

sides, many divisions were composed of ‘mobilised’ conscripts, consisting of soldiers in their

30s and 40s. Their standard of training was dependent on their wave of mobilisation as a

reservist force. On average, most had only a couple of weeks of training. Nevertheless –

apart from the Dutch Forces, which were predominantly reservists – professional, well-

equipped forces were established on all sides. On the Belgian side, the Chasseurs

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