The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 2

The German strategy (see Map 2.2) was to use Army Group B as the ‘matador’s cloak’

to lure the bulk of the French forces into Belgium and away from the main point of attack.

Army Group B’s purpose was to contain the enemy forces and to disallow them to disengage

from battle in order to reinforce other areas further south.

Army Group C, with only 18 divisions, was left to defend the Siegfried line (a line of

defensive forts and tank defences) and launch diversionary attacks on the Maginot Line

without any intention to breach it. Their aim was likewise to tie up French reserves.

The audacity of the plan was the focus of an attack on an area that placed great

demands on German ingenuity. The weight of the armoured attack was to be at the upper

Meuse in the area of Sedan, at the outer edge of the Maginot line, assumed to be the

weakest point in the French front line. It was an area unsuitable for major armoured

operation, but offered a gateway into the rear of the Maginot Line and of the bulk of the

French Forces committed to the north. Once across the Meuse, Army group A, and in

particular Panzer Group Kleist with 41,000 vehicles, was to swing westwards, enacting the

Sichelschnitt , and thrust to the channel coast, thereby encircling the French forces and their

allies.

Operation Yellow set out to breakthrough the French lines at Sedan, to be followed by a

drive north. These plans did not detail what should happen afterwards. Guderian, in charge

of the XIX Panzer Corps, in addressing this ambiguity, recalled:

‘Unless I receive orders to the contrary, I intend on the next day to continue my advance

westwards. The supreme leadership must decide whether my objective is to be Amiens

or Paris. In my opinion the correct course is to drive past Amiens to the English

Channel’. Hitler nodded and said nothing more. Only General Busch, who commanded

the Sixteenth Army on my left, cried out: ‘Well, I do not think you cross the river in the

first place!’ (Horne 1990, 212)

In 1936, France was embroiled in political and economic turmoil. Germany reoccupied

the Rhineland. The increasing threat of Germany concluded in a mechanisation and

conscription programme, to match that of German in quantity of men and materials. That

would allow the Allies to go on the offensive as early as 1941. Gamelin’s − the Supreme

Commander French Land Forces – considerations however, curtailed the offensive

ambitions that had been laid out as early as 1919; to prevent another bloodshed on France’s

‘sacred’ soil. Hence, the focus was on two areas. Along the southern border, the Maginot

line provided enough protection to contain any German offensive. In the north, the Allies

would have to rely on the Dyle-Breda plan. The strong Seventh Army under General Giraud

was placed there. In collaboration with the British Expeditionary Force (BFF) and General

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