The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 2

among German generalship. In order to surprise an enemy, the envelope had to be pushed

beyond what one knew from past experience. Visionaries took the upper hand.

If there is a criticism about the strategic planning of the Germans, it is that their vision

mainly referred to the operational necessity of breaking through the French lines in the

Centre and then, through encirclement, demoralising French Forces. Once that aim was

accomplished, lack of vision beyond the capitulation of France left a vacuum. At the eve of

Operation Yellow’s commencement, no vision, let alone any plan, was in place to defeat

another enemy: Great Britain.

In contrast to opportunistic thinking, the French strategy was characterised by myopic,

out-dated expectations. The campaign in the west in 1940 was preceded by a range of

engagements that could have provided the French with an idea of what the Axis forces were

capable of. Despite these valuable insights, the common belief that ‘It cannot happen to us’

prevailed. This perception revealed overconfidence in their own plans which were believed

to be so detailed and complete that they would cover all eventualities. Readiness to counter

any eventuality other than an attack in the north severely limited their strategic flexibility as

prevailing overconfidence was rarely challenged. Concerns about their defences, in

particular in the area around Sedan were ignored. Exercises or War Games probing these

defences and the readiness of the Allied forces either did not take place, or their outcomes

were discounted as not applicable to a ‘real life’ scenario. In a memorandum written by

Colonel Charles de Gaulle, General Keller (Inspector-General of Tanks) pointed out:

…Even supposing that the present fortified line were breached or outflanked, it does not

appear that our opponents will find a combination of circumstances as favourable as

Blitzkrieg was in Poland. One can see, then, that in future operations the primary role of

the tank will be the same as in the past: to assist the infantry in reaching successive

objectives. (Horne 1990, 179)

Sensitivity. The Germans did plan. Nevertheless, the credo of German commanders was

Helmuth von Moltke the Elder’s (1800−1891) no plan survives contact with the enemy . It was

a necessity for German commanders to lead from the front, to remain tactically sensitive to

an unpredictable, ever changing situation. Such sensitivity at a tactical level, and its

translation into operations and strategy was assisted by the use of wireless communications

(see Chapter 4).

In contrast, French generalship received many situation reports about the unfolding

campaign. Communications from the front-line arrived frequently, but they were often

outdated and ambiguous (see Chapter 4). Fuelled by overconfidence, reports that indicated

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