The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 2

their effects are similar to those of a lost battle.

So we see that the destruction of the enemy’s military forces, the overthrow of the enemy’s

power, is only to be achieved through the effect of a battle, whether or not it actually takes

place, or is merely offered and not accepted.

2. Twofold object of the combat

But these effects are of two kinds, direct and indirect. They are the latter kind if other things

intervene and become the object of combat – things which are not in themselves the

destruction of the enemy’s force, but lead up to it, certainly by a circuitous road, but with so

much the greater effect. The possession of provinces, towns, fortresses, roads, bridges,

magazines etc. may be the IMMEDIATETE object of a battle, but never the ultimate one.

Things of this description can never be looked upon otherwise than as a means of gaining

greater superiority, so as at last to offer battle to the enemy in such a way that it will be

impossible for him to accept it. Therefore all these things can only be regarded as

intermediate links, steps as it were, leading up to the effectual principle, but never that

principle itself. (Adapted from Von Clausewitz 2011, 71)

Strategy embraces the following points:

1. The selection of the theatre of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of

which it admits.

2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favourable

direction for operations.

3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations

4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive

5. The strategic fronts, lines of defence, and fronts of operations

6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.

7. For a given operation, the best strategic line, and the different manoeuvres necessary to

embrace all cases

14 | P a g e