The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 2

heavily overengineered and underpowered – the engine power had not kept up with the weight – and

broke down before or during the first days of the offensive.

Logistical shortcomings further delayed the German offensive. Stockpiles of fuel and ammunition

were rushed to the front. In addition to 2,451 tanks, the Germans amassed 777,000 soldiers, 7,417

artillery pieces and around 2,000 aircraft in the area, a third of all their available military strength. The

launch date for Operation Zitadelle was finally set for 5 July 1943. General Friedrich von Mellenthin

argued: “No offensive was ever prepared as carefully as this one." (Fawcett 2010)

Surprise had been at the centre of German success in the past. However, due to their own

intelligence and those coming from Bletchley codebreakers, the Russians surmised early on that the

Germans would attempt a major offensive in this area. In March 1943, four months prior to the

offensive, Soviet intelligence indicated major German troop concentrations around Orel and Kharkov,

the two staging areas for the planned pincer movement.

The Russians started preparing for a defence in depth across a 150km-wide front north of

Belgorod, heavily relying on minefields and interlocking fire. Trenches and anti-tank ditches were dug

with the help of 300,000 conscripted civilians. 400,000 mines were laid: 2,400 anti-tank and 2,800

anti-personnel devices were placed in every mile ahead of the German assault. Whereas the line of

defence in France in 1940 had amounted to 25km, the Red Army’s depth of defence extended to

approximately 300km.

On 5 th July 1943, the Germans embarked on their last major offensive in the east. Although

rapidly gaining air superiority, the advance on the ground was bogged down. Many of the newly

arrived tanks – Panthers, Tiger I and IIs – broke down. Others were disabled by anti-tank fire and anti-

tank mines. These did not often lead to tanks being knocked out but most were write-offs as they

could not be recovered or they did not have spare parts as these were delivered in woefully

insufficient quantities.

The Germans advanced, but by no means at the speed of 1940. The Red Army had learned its

lessons from the enormous defeats in 1941/42, and gradually retreated once its position became

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