The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 3

Deciding factors: Redundancy, Determination, Agility

The French and their Allies established a largely rigid defence, to be ‘plugged’ if in danger of

being pierced. However, the Germans punched through the front line, around Sedan, just

three days after they commenced their offensive. The French front line was not robust

enough in the first place to stop the concentration of German effort. Second, the French

were too slow to move their mobile resources to the section of the front line in question. Most

of their crack divisions had already been committed to the north, where the Allies expected

the Germans to focus their Schwerpunkt .

Redundancy. The Germans made efficient use of their limited men and material. They

concentrated their best divisions on the core outcome trajectory, the operational goal to

cross the river Meuse, and drive through the French front line, letting loose their armoured

divisions in the rear of the main allied force. A breadth of expertise and resources was

focussed on succeeding in an incredibly difficult undertaking: an amphibious crossing. This

endeavour was carried out with redundancy contingencies in place. Not just one, but four

Panzer Corps were tasked to cross the river Meuse in three different sectors (XV Panzer

Corps Hoth, Kleist’s Panzer Group with XLI Panzer Corps Reinhardt, XIX Panzer Corps

Guderian and XIV Motorised Corps Wietersheim). The priority was to generate the greatest

impact; being efficient in doing so was a subordinate concern.

From a French perspective, a continuous front-line, up to a depth of 15km had been

established, with some sections more fortified than others. Nevertheless, large sections of

those resources were rigid, bound to become redundant and thus ineffective, once the front

line had been broken at other places. The Maginot Line was predominantly manned by

fortress division, not trained for open ground warfare. Weaponry installed in casemates

could not be reinstalled quickly for use at other hot spots. Large swathes of the French

forces were destined to become redundant if the Germans focussed their attack on a

relatively narrow stretch. So when the Germans launched distraction attacks against the

Maginot line, though they pinned down a considerable number of divisions, the fortresses’

protection and massive firepower became unfocussed and thus useless.

Determination. The Germans were opportunistic, imaginative and purposeful in focussing

their centre of gravity at the most vulnerable point in the French defence; the area around

Sedan. Such determination was however risky, as this area also presented the greatest

environmental obstacles, whether in the thickly forested staging area of the Ardennes or in

the need to make multiple amphibious crossings of the rivers Semois and Meuse.

The French determination of the German COG was largely defined by focussing on the

‘obvious’ (see Chapter 2), and anchored expectations that the main attack would be

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