The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 3

Two GIs [prisoners] and some Germans have built a fire for warmth using furniture as

firewood. The whole time debris is falling from the walls and arches around them … a shell

tears open the wall behind the choir, another demolishes the corner walls above the crypt

and undermines the supports of the church tower. The smell of powder burns their throats

as they huddle against one another near the choir stall… (Reynolds 1995, 225)

The attacks on La Gleize by the Americans were initially repulsed due to the clever positioning of

tanks and tank destroyers, and yet Peiper’s force was surrounded, critically short of fuel and

ammunition. During the night to 24 th December, Peiper’s forces started slipping through the American

positions, leaving most of their heavy equipment – among them three Tiger IIs and thirteen PzKpfW

Vs (Panthers) – behind.

The eastward march of the exhausted men of the Kampfgruppe Peiper through American lines

saw the beginning of the end of the Battle of the Bulge. The battle would continue until 25 January,

but the events at La Gleize had sealed the fate of Germany’s attempt to turn the tide in the west.

In May 1940, the Germans had pushed through the thickly forested area of the Ardennes to

breach the Allied defences around Sedan. They covered 200km in the first 36 hours alone. In

contrast, in December 1944, the Germans only managed to create a ‘bulge’ that ranged from

Hallschlag (Germany) to La Gleize (Belgium), a mere 80km in eight days. Environmental conditions

played a considerable role in slowing the German advance. Too few roads, often single-track roads,

unsuitable in particular for heavy tanks, exceeding 60ts. The lack of fuel and the absence of the

German Luftwaffe providing effective ground support further hampered necessary agility in

movement. On many occasions, the Germans could only advance under cover of darkness.

The Allies performed better than four years earlier. The slow, predictable advance of the

Germans offered ample opportunity to establish a moving defence. Initially, rear-guard actions

covered the retreat of those front-line units that felt the brunt of the German attack. Nevertheless, in

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