The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 3

The weeks and months leading up to the German invasion had been used by the French

2nd and 9th armies to reinforce their defences, while training their forces. During the Phoney

War, the depth of defences around Sedan was increased from 2.5 to 5 km, with the

construction of a second defensive line 15 km behind the principal line of defence:

In all the depth of the position on the principal line, as well as the stopping line or

between these lines, the defence will be organised into circular fighting positions

or centres of resistance, capable of defending themselves when isolated, even if

bypassed by enemy infantry or tanks. As a consequence, the fighting positions or

centres of resistance will be interwoven with obstacles of terrain, woods, villages,

etc. (IIe Armée, n.d.)

Great effort was expended by the 2 nd and 9 th armies on improving their defences along

the river Meuse, at times at the cost of preparing the units needed to utilise these defences.

Most bridges had been demolished or prepared with explosive charges, in anticipation of a German attack. The night to May 13 th was filled with the noise of vehicles. Night

reconnaissance flights had indicated that a massive column of vehicles congested all those

roads towards the Meuse, south of Namur.

Schwerpunkt Versus La Colmatage

In executing an operation, the Germans relied on the principle of Schwerpunkt (centre of

gravity) which implies that maximum effort should be ‘concentrated’ on where the enemy is

believed to be weakest. An attack would start with a frontal attack, to tie down enemy forces

and prevent the enemy from diverting forces to the actual area of the Schwerpunkt , narrow

sectors of attack. In WWI, particularly in the east, the Germans achieved considerable

successes through the use of intensively concentrated effort, piercing the enemy’s line and

thus accomplishing the main objective of creating disruption in the rear of an enemy army.

Elite-units would create a breach in the enemy’s frontline, by which mobile forces could

break through and quickly move through to the rear of the enemy. The reserves that followed

would widen the breach and engage in flanking ( Flankenangriff ), enveloping

( Umfassungsangriff ), and encircling ( Einkreisung ) the enemy, in order to widen the breach

and to prevent an effective counterattack. As a result, while mobile units drove deeper into

enemy territory, any form of enemy countermeasure from the flanks and rear of the

Schwerpunkt were subdued. The Schwerpunkt principle builds on having the best units

driving a wedge into the enemy’s frontline, the support of reserves to preserve the breach,

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