The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

From a French perspective, decision power did not migrate – fast enough – to those

leaders who were most aware of the situation. Commanders of the fighting positions at Fort

d'Ében-Émael were not allowed to assume authority unless they received an order, despite

their understanding that their fort was being attacked. These orders would not have come

from Major Jottrand, but from their own unit commander. These obscure levels of authority,

combined with the lack of initiative at the front-line, produced a peculiar scenario. Coupola

120, the most powerful artillery position, was left unmolested by the Germans for a

considerable time. The commander was keenly aware of the intentions of the German

assault group. He desperately tried to maintain control of the gun although he never fired a

single shot to provide artillery fire for other forts or to disrupt the assault on the Meuse

bridges. The gun was finally disabled by German shaped charges.

It is no surprise that in the first crucial days of the campaign, action on the French side

was slow. The sluggishness in responding to the rapidly changing environment was

amplified by the lack of means to communicate. Wired relay of information broke down

quickly due to the incessant artillery fire of the Germans. As a result, pigeons were used.

Once information was received at headquarters, more precious time was used by staff to get

the information to the appropriate general, often using a runner. Real-time communication

was virtually out of the question. By the time information reached its intended recipient, it

was already outdated.

The business of real-time communication was less of an issue on the German side, as

most key decision makers were already close to the front line, and thus were able rapidly to

establish what was going on in their sectors.

Sensitivity. The greater the distance communication has to travel, the more links in the

communication chain it has to travel through, the greater is the chance that communications

are misplaced or misinterpreted.

German commanders in many cases operated close to the front-line. At the top of Fort

d'Ében-Émael, they were able to rely on non-verbal cues, as they were observing the

unfolding operation first hand. Constant updates from subordinates were matched in-real

time by the impressions the commander was able to ascertain through direct personal

observation. Relaying verbal communication was facilitated by the fact that the area of

operation was relatively small, so that fighting forces operated in close proximity with each

other. Even the artillery fire called in from other surrounding forts did not considerably reduce

sensitivity to the unfolding situation. Notwithstanding, the lack of attention given to the still

functioning Coupola 120 also underlined the reality of the ‘fog of war’.

The tactical sensitivity displayed in the capture of Fort d'Ében-Émael was displayed on

numerous occasions, such as in the crossing of the river Meuse further south. Officers such

as Guderian (XIX Panzer Corps, Sedan) and Rommel (7th Panzer, Dinant) ‘led from the

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