The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

[Text Box starts] Von Clausewitz: Information in war

A great part of the information in War is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the

greatest part is of a doubtful character. What is required of an officer is a certain power of

discrimination, which only knowledge of men and things and good judgement can confer. The law of

probability must be his guide. This is not a trifling difficulty even in respect of the first plans, which can

be formed in the chamber outside the real sphere of war, but it is enormously increased when, in the

thick of war itself, one report follows hard upon the heels of another; it is fortunate if these reports, in

contradicting each other, show a certain balance of probability, and thus themselves call for scrutiny.

It is much worse for the inexperienced when accident does not render him this service, but one report

supports another, confirms it, magnifies it, finishes off the picture with fresh touches of colour, until

necessity in urgent haste forces from us a resolution which will soon be discovered to be folly, all

those reports having been lies, exaggerations, errors. (Adapted from Von Clausewitz 2011, 31)

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Translation and Explanation: Centralisation versus Decentralisation

The military concepts of Mission Command and Methodical Battle have found their way into

the realm of management, although often referred to under a different name: centralisation

and decentralisation. At the core of these concepts is the location of decision-making power.

Centralisation implies that authority is accumulated at the higher, strategic echelons of

an organisation (see Table 4.1). Decisions are made ‘at the top’ and then communicated

down to subordinates; who are compliant to its execution. Decentralisation is the opposite.

Authority is devolved to the tactical level of an organisation, to regions or to subordinates.

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