The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

There was little effort to deliver inter-unit training or to rehearse the ability of the fort to

counter an attack from the east, let alone one from the air. At 03:30 on 10 th May 1940, an armada of JU82 towing gliders started from separate

airfields and tried to rendezvous within the borders of Germany. To form a tight formation

was by no means an easy task:

Sometime later our aircraft and gliders rendezvoused with the 11 gliders of the

Iron section which had taken off from the Cologne-Butzweilerhof airfield. And it

was then that an unforeseen and wholly unanticipated accident threatened the

hitherto smooth running organisation of the operation. Manoeuvring into a

compact air formation the machine pulling the glider with Leutnant Witzig aboard

flew across the path of one of the other aircraft, and Witzig’s pilot had to bank

sharply to avoid his tow rope getting entangled with that of the second glider.

Unfortunately, the extra stress occasioned by this evasive manoeuvre resulted in

the tow rope snapping and Witzig’s glider was no longer under tow. Turning back,

the pilot was just able to get his glider back Across the Rhine before landing. But

the assault section had lost its commander.” (Kuhn 1978, 33)

The assault on Fort d'Ében-Émael commenced without their nominated leader Witzig,

crossing the border to Belgium.

At around 06:45, the first gliders were released, and in downward circles they made their

way to the top of the fort. The Belgian defenders noticed the towing aircrafts but were

unperturbed as they were making their way back to Germany. Not much later, though, they

were puzzled about some sort of airplanes that appeared to want to land on top of them.

Some defenders present on the top of Fort d'Ében-Émael opened fire. Their obsolete

weaponry did pin down the landed attackers for a brief time; however most mobile anti-

aircraft weapons positioned on the surface of the fort remained silent or were put out of

action quickly.

The alarm in the fort was raised, although it was the wrong one. The alarm indicated an

assault from the surrounding countryside. Precious minutes were lost when crew members

rushed to their observation cupolas and the fighting positions that covered the top of the fort.

They noticed in awe more people disembarking from gliders, and saw them running towards

their fortified position with ‘strange’ boxes. However, most casemates remained silent. Some

crews had not occupied their positions yet; others had not received orders to open fire.

In quick succession, the Germans placed these boxes − shaped charges – on specific

weak points of the firing positions posing a threat to the landed forces. Coupole Nord and Mi-

Sud and Mi-Nord were knocked out. At Maastricht 1, Oberjäger Arendt placed a 12.5kg

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