The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter 5

people, structures, skills, process and systems to produce collective work in service of the

shared direction. The willingness of people to prioritise the success of the collective work

above their own interests, to devote their time and energy in service of the shared direction,

is a form of leadership commitment (McCauley and Fick-Cooper 2015).

The creation of Direction, Alignment and Commitment in 1940, though were constrained

and defined by military doctrines:

Both the French and German styles of leadership came from the two armies’ doctrines.

While one emphasised the management of men and material in methodical battles

[administrative], the other emphasised rapid decisions and personal influences at

decisive points in highly mobile battles [adaptive]. In other circumstances, the French

approach of having commanders “on the handle of a fan” may have been appropriate,

but in the dynamic battles of 1940, the approach appeared to be completely out of place.

(Doughty 1990, 331)

Direction. German commanders, often at a level down to Sergeant, made ad hoc decisions,

within the boundaries of Intent (see Chapter 4), repeatedly without waiting for detailed orders

from higher echelons. During the six-week campaign, commissioned as well as non-

commissioned officers excelled in making operational and tactical decisions, changing

direction as deemed necessary to adapt to a changing environment. In other words, direction

was not produced by officers with rank and status; but by those that were sensitive enough

to understand what direction needed to be taken. In regards to the usefulness of Intent, it

provides lower-ranked troops with a responsibility to constantly direct, though less so by

order and obedience to these orders and rather through personal commitment.

The Allies believed in the power of administrative direction. Men and material were

directed, in line with strict timetables. Again, such an approach may be unsurprising, given

the number of conscripts who, in default of experience, required detailed orders.

Nevertheless, most crack units also fell under the spell of being ordered to be at a place and

time. In so far, the leadership style of the French High Command is that like of a chess-

board, moving around chess-pieces without an appreciation that many of the front-line

leaders’ capabilities to lead are being subdued. As a result, operational and tactical

leadership was characterised by hesitation, ignorance and at times panic with the absence

of clear orders from a higher authority.

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