The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter-6

The situation was not hopeless for the Allies (see Map 6.1). The rapid advance by the

Germans created a large salient. This presented an opportunity for the Allies to

counterattack, stop the German’s westernmost approach towards Amiens and Arras, break

through their lines and cut off considerable German forces. On May 16 th , Winston Churchill met Daladier and Reynaud in the French Foreign

Ministry at the Quai d’Orsay. After Gamelin provided the British and French politicians with a

situational assessment, the focus of attention was on the emerging ‘bulge’ at Sedan.

Churchill asked in his nonchalant manner, in bad French, Où est la masse de manoeuvre?

(Where is the strategic reserve?). Gamelin replied in a similar and sobering manner:

“Aucune” (None). The strategic reserve was committed to the north of Belgium, as part of the

Dyle-Breda plan, and currently relentlessly engaged by the German advancing forces.

To make matters worse, the British started disengaging from what they believed to be a

lost battle. The French soon noted British intentions:

At 10:30 General Weygand came into the Prime Minister’s room, and found Marshal

Pétain already there. I remained throughout this meeting, which lasted until a quarter to

one.

On entering, the General whispered to me, “The situation is very serious, for the

English are falling back on the ports instead of attacking to the south.” He told the Prime

Minister that according to a telegram from the French liaison office with the King of the

Belgians, actually the only means of communication between the British Army and

General Blanchard, the English had abandoned Arras without being compelled by the

Germans to do so, and appeared to be retreating in the direction of the ports. This was

contrary to the formal instructions given by General Weygand to the British army according to the plans shown on Wednesday the 22 nd to the British Prime Minister and

approved by him.

General Weygand declared that this strategy on the part of the British Army did not

surprise him, for on the previous evening he had been struck by General Ironside’s tone

over the telephone. “I would willingly have boxed his ears”, said General Weygand, and

then went on, “It is impossible to command an army which remains dependent on

London in the matter of military operations. All this is the more regrettable in that

yesterday and during the night Besson’s army group, coming from the south, reached

the Somme, while Colonel’s de Gaulle’s armour is at Boves, ready to issue forth to

assist the southern army to move north.” (Baudouin 1948, 43)

May 17 th saw one of the first planned counterattacks by the French from the north and

south. These French efforts would be complemented by British attempts to disrupt the

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