The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 7

challenged as the French and their Allies did not engage in major combat activities between

1918 and 1940. As a consequence, changes to doctrinal thinking were few and far between.

The lessons of WWI led to a different executive judgement by the Germans during the

interwar years. The development of the Siegfriedstellung (the Siegfried line, commonly

referred to as the Westwall), a fortified line of defensive forts and tank defences built in

1916-17 and expanded in the interwar years, indicated a similar preventative control

approach to resilience. Nevertheless, this was a mere precaution in case of an attack by the

Western Allies. Innovations in technology went hand in hand with the development of new

thinking in how to exploit such technology to offer greater power of destruction (e.g. hollow

charge) and movement (e.g. the further development of the tank). These means were transformed into “new” 1 strategic doctrinal thinking, and experimented on during the initial

campaigns in Poland, to a more limited extent in Norway as that was a predominantly

amphibious invasion, and in France.

Notwithstanding, the German military machine also experienced a similar erosion of

resilient capabilities, post 1941.The successes of the early war years were followed by major

crises, among them the defeats of the Afrika Corps in Tunisia and the 6th Army at Stalingrad

in 1943, each of which had an erosive impact on the degree of adaptive innovation applied

(see Table 7.3).

At its best

Signs of weakness

Germany, post-1940

Productive tension disrupts

Entrenched thinking; People

The Germans

existing patterns and generates a

often resist even when

experienced major

search for new possibilities

acknowledging adaptive

setbacks, reducing their

challenges

desire and “space” to

innovate.

Creative thinking and problem

Lack of diversity of people and

solving by people drawing on

outlooks; nonconforming voices

multiple perspectives and taking

are ignored; people are too

risks in a safe environment

frightened to try something new

Collective strategic action with rich

Silos; people refer to “them” and

interactions, coalition forming,

“us”; resources or ideas are not

negotiation and compromise

shared

Systems-wide changes across

Quick fixes; local changes;

borders and boundaries;

reinventing the wheel; change is

multidimensional and fundamental

resource intensive and slow – the

changes

search for solutions goes on

Table 7.3: Adaptive Innovation: at its best; signs of weakness; Germany post-1940 (Adapted from Denyer 2017)

1 As outlined in Chapters 1 and 2, the concept pf Blitzkrieg was not one that was purposefully developed. Most concepts that the Germans adopted originated in the experiences of the late WWI years. Hence, they cannot be considered as revolutionary and new, but rather as evolutionary and progressive.

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