The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 1

A 37mm in position in the French countryside. This was a commonly deployed anti-tank gun, which turned out to be inadequate to knock-out most French medium and heavy tanks (BArch, n.d.).

Morale. The morale of the French Army, especially in the initial stages of the Meuse

crossing and despite the later rout, can also not be held accountable for the ultimate

collapse of the front near Sedan. Multiple accounts (Doughty 1976; May 2009) underline the

tenacity and courage with which the French, British and Belgian (in particular the Belgian

Chasseurs Ardennais ) defenders opposed the German invaders.

In the north, two French armoured divisions slowed down two entire Panzer divisions

between 12 and 14 May, inflicting substantial losses on their German foes. The French only

retreated after their flanks were exposed due to the fall of Fort d’Ében-Émael.

Despite these tactical victories, there are also numerous accounts of retreat and units

being routed by the Germans. On some of these occasions, individual units moved back

from their dedicated positions as they were ordered to do, or as they deemed their situation

to be unsustainable. On others, units were overwhelmed by the German onslaught, and

remnants of the French units fell back in disarray.

Being let down. It is often said that the BEF let their French allies down, and that the

retreat and consequential evacuation of the British (and Allied) forces was too hasty,

representing a betrayal of the French. Paul Baudouin, the Under-Secretary of State and

Secretary of the War Cabinet in Paul Reynaud's Administration wrote:

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