The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 1

Friday, May 24 th , 1940:

At 10:30 General Weygand came into the Prime Minister’s room, and found Marshal

Pétain already there. I remained throughout this meeting, which lasted until a quarter to

one.

On entering, the General whispered to me, “The situation is very serious, for the

English are falling back on the ports instead of attacking to the south.” He told the Prime

Minister that according to a telegram from the French liaison office with the King of the

Belgians, actually the only means of communication between the British Army and

General Blanchard, the English had abandoned Arras without being compelled by the

Germans to do so, and appeared to be retreating in the direction of the ports. This was

contrary to the formal instructions given by General Weygand to the British army according to the plans shown on Wednesday the 22 nd to the British Prime Minister and

approved by him.

General Weygand declared that this strategy on the part of the British Army did not

surprise him, for on the previous evening he had been struck by General Ironside’s tone

over the telephone. “I would willingly have boxed his ears”, said General Weygand, and

then went on, “It is impossible to command an army which remains dependent on

London in the matter of military operations. All this is the more regrettable in that

yesterday and during the night Besson’s army group, coming from the south, reached

the Somme, while Colonel de Gaulle’s armour is at Boves, ready to issue forth to assist

the southern army to move north. (Baudouin 1948, 43)

This perception of treachery was reinforced by Britain’s war against the French Vichy

forces. The animosity between these two parties found its climax in the bombardment of the

French fleet at the Algerian port of Mers-el-Kébir in July 1940, which resulted in the

destruction of large parts of the French fleet and the death of 1,297 French sailors. Indeed,

throughout the campaign, the Allied efforts to battle the Germans were characterised by a

lack of co-ordination. This was largely due to mistrust, egotism and overconfidence on all

sides. It is natural to think that each ally was driven by the need to save their own skins.

Given the numbers of counterattacks, the occasions where the Dutch, Belgians, British and

French tried to stop the German advance were indeed heroic, but most often ill-conceived,

too little and too late.

Quality of tank forces. The French tanks were superior to their German

counterparts in protection and firepower (see textbox). Most German tanks and anti-tank

guns – apart from the high velocity 88 mm Flak 18/36 – could not penetrate the front armour

of a B1, S35 or Matilda Mark II. However, the Allied tanks had a significant drawback. The

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