The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 3

and the freedom of front-line officers to use their judgement as to where the centre of gravity

(COG) concentration of efforts should be.

[Text Box starts] De Jomini: Assembly of forces in space

The proposal is that there is one great principle underlying all the operations of war; a principle which

must be followed. It is summed up in the following maxims:

1. Use strategic movements to throw the mass of your army, in successive waves, at the

decisive points in the theatre of war, and also at the communications of the enemy, as far as

possible without compromising your own.

2. Manoeuvre so that you engage subdivisions of the hostile army with the bulk of your own

forces.

3. On the battle-field, throw the mass of your forces at the decisive point, or at that portion of the

enemy line which you most need to overthrow.

4. Make sure that these masses are not only thrown at the decisive point, but that they will

engage the enemy with optimum timing and energy. (Adapted from De Jomini 2008, 47)

[TEXT BOX ENDS]

In contrast, the French, as well as their Allies, banked on the tactical measure of having a

‘continuous’ defence in depth providing massive firepower. Several lines of resistance were

established, that might not stop an attacking force but would slow it down. Time would be

gained to repair the gap in the main line of resistance – based on the principle of colmater

(plugging a hole) – and if that were not possible, to allow forces to fall back to a succession

of prepared defences in the rear of the main line of defence.

Whereas Schwerpunkt requires mobility in attack, La Colmatage is directed at massing

resources, partially immobile, along a continuous fortified front. Ultimately, any attempts to

plug the breaches at Dinant (and Houx), Monthermé and Sedan were half-hearted, as most

of the available mobile forces were not ready to be dispatched, or were used in a ‘drip-feed’

manner, in stark contrast to what Schwerpunkt implies.

Only later in the campaign did the French switch to a ‘hedgehog’ tactic of defence.

Instead of maintaining a continuous front, they established strongpoints – usually fortified

towns and villages – to allow the Germans to bypass them, striking their flanks, and cutting

off their supply columns, to ‘strangle’ the forwardmost units. This principle was part of the

Weygand line and was implemented to disrupt Operation Red (see Chapter 7).

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