The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 4

This approach seems straightforward, given the fact that the French Army was largely a

Citizen Army. Most of their lower ranks just did not have the experience and training to be

autonomous and ‘intelligent’ in their actions. Hence, most of the training of the immobile

fortress forces revolved around constructing defences and some around handling their

weaponry. They were not meant to adapt to any situation other than meeting a German

assault with massive firepower.

The means of communication, relaying orders down from the top of the command to the

lower levels took time, too much time in the case of the French. Information that reached the

front lines was often out-of-date; the Germans advanced so quickly that the real-time

communication of the Allies could not keep up with it. The confusion at the front-line was

amplified by the unrealistic optimism channelled down from higher levels. To put it simply,

front line soldiers often mentioned that the order and the situation they confronted did not

make sense. And yet, they were bound to that order. Their only available plan B was to

retreat, away from the Germans.

Organisations, such as Volkswagen, may well adopt the French approach of

centralisation, and top managers may make their workforce ‘obedient’ to their will. But it is

folly to believe that top managers have all the ‘right’ answers. Most often, they believe they

have but, driven by power struggles, isolation in ‘knowing better’ and a safe remoteness from

tactical problems, they deprive the lower levels of licence to think, even discouraging front-

line employees from doing so. The top-manager only has to be wrong once; no one else can

or would want to step into the breach to sort out the problem.

In contrast, a decentralised way of making decision offers the application of greater local

knowledge and the exploitation of capabilities of ‘front-line’ soldiers that can make a

difference at a local level. Nevertheless, a form of decentralisation requires commitment, the

willingness of people to prioritise the strategic and operational objectives above their own

individual interest (e.g. for glory). In the case of the battle of Leyte Gulf in late 1944, the lack

of commitment by senior figures led to local action that was not aligned to the shared

direction; leading to a near-disaster.

As such organisation may find centralisation simpler to carry out and thus more efficient.

However, history shows that the effort to decentralise is worth the long term outcomes, if

commitment and alignment is established (see Chapter 5 for more insights into Commitment

and Alignment).

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