The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter 5

Nevertheless, such tactical victories are in vain if the German advance cannot be

stopped at Stonne or elsewhere at the Meuse front. Whereas the German front-line officers

were opportunistic in their push forward, not allowing the French to solidify their defence,

French officers showed hesitation that passed the baton of surprise to the Germans. Another example is that of the French 3 rd Armoured Division, at their disposal a formidable force of 62 heavy Char B1 tanks and 73 medium Hotchkiss H-39 tanks. XXIst corps, under General Flavigny, was complemented by the 3 rd Armoured division,

led by General Brocard. This division was set up in March 1940, and suffered from

shortages in fuel and foremost preparedness. When Flavigny approached Brocard in regard to launching a counterattack on the 14 th , Brocard replied:

We are not ready … We came to this area to continue training of the division.

It is not a question of training; it is necessary to fight. This is urgent. Can you be at

your departure position at 1100 hours?

That is impossible. I am not resupplied with fuel, answered Brocard.

What? asked Flavigny. If you were an infantryman, your men would have eaten. If

you were a cavalryman, your horses would have received their oats … in the vicinity of

the enemy. Your fuel tanks are not empty. How much time will it take to complete your

refuelling?

Four hours

That’s impossible (Doughty 1990, 286)

While the French were throwing their units at the Germans in a piece-meal fashion,

desperately catching up with a timetable that the Germans imposed on them, the Germans

disrupted and destroyed their efforts for a successful counterattack, one-by-one. A decisive,

organised attack against the Meuse front would have likely led to a French strategic victory.

Instead, three German corps – XV (Hoth), XLI (Reinhardt) and XIX (Guderian) broke through

just five days after the commencement of hostilities, and were let loose to race towards the

English Channel, into the rear of the Maginot line and the bulk of the Allied crack forces in

the north.

Deciding factors: Direction, Alignment, and Commitment

Adaptive Leadership is associated with three properties: Direction, Alignment and

Commitment. Direction refers to a shared and collective agreement on the vision, mission,

goals and aims of the group. Direction implies change, a change from the current reality

towards some future state. Alignment is defined as the coordination and integration of

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