The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter-6

because the direction in which they pointed was the direction of our own front line. (Von

Kielmannsegg; J 1941, 164)

The Germans improvised a mine-barrier, as they noticed in horror that the French made

their way into the streets of Lislet. Kielmansegg rushed back to Guderian’s headquarters to

warn him of the impending disaster. On his way, he stumbled across some German tanks

that had just left their repair depot. He also mustered a few light anti-aircraft guns which, he

deployed even though they could not penetrate the armour of the French tanks:

In spite of the fact that my light flak guns (which I had brought up in the interim) could

not penetrate their thick armour, by firing at the tracks of the French machines they

forced them to turn about. (Von Kielmannsegg; J 1941, 166)

A 31.5t Char B1. They were deployed most often only in single units, with the purpose to support infantry. The coordination between tank and infantry, as well as with close air support was woefully inadequate. (BArch, n.d.)

Some French tanks were finally shot-up, but the defence at Montcernet and Lislet was

woefully inadequate. The French attacked again in the afternoon, but a familiar picture of

operational and logistical ineptitude made them disengage before they could fully exploit

their surprising raid on the German rear. Captain Idée noted:

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