The Need for Organisational Resilience Chapter-6

19:00 hours: Petrol is running low. The ‘B’ [Char B] tanks have just turned about. They

are leaving Lilset. The infantry had not been able to follow them, and what can we do

without them? There must be some infiltration at our rear. The enemy platoon

commanders have a terribly enterprising air about them. (Horne 1990, 494)

De Gaulle resumed his attack two days later, but was increasingly pounded from the air and worn down by the 10 th Panzer division that had been redirected from the Battle of

Stonne. The pressure mounted. The French counterattack fizzled out.

The counterattack from the south (see Map 6.1) did not bring a breakthrough, failing to

punch through the German communications line. From the north, though, the BEF, under the command of General Lord Gort planned an attack southwards from Arras on May 21 st . Their

available strength was as pitiful as what was at De Gaulle’s disposal: two infantry divisions

and the 1st Army Tank Brigade, mustering a total of fifty-eight Mark I and sixteen Mark II

(later christened ‘Matilda’) infantry tanks, slow, but with a 2-pounder gun that could knock out

most of their German counterparts, although only at relatively close range. The plan was to

bolster the British with French armour, but a good part of the French 1st Light Mechanised

Division had been committed to support De Gaulle’s attack, and other motorised units were

destroyed in the bitter fighting with the Germans. Gort decided not to wait for any further

reinforcements and instructed General Martel to proceed with an attack southwards. On May 21 st Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division was to proceed round the flank of Arras, while the 5 th Panzer Division advanced to north-east of it. Rommel’s flanks were protected

by the SS Totenkopf (deathhead) and rifle regiments. Not long after, the forward sections of

General Martel’s ‘Frankforce’ got in contact with the Germans. Rommel commented:

The enemy tank fire created chaos and confusion among our troops in the village

[Wailly, south of Arras] and they were jamming up the roads and yards with their

vehicles, instead of going into action with every available weapon to fight off the

oncoming enemy. We tried to create order. After notifying the divisional staff of the

critical situation in and around Wailly we drove off to a hill 1,000 yards west of the

village. We found a light AA [anti-aircraft] troop and several anti-tank guns located in

hollows and a small wood, most of them totally under cover. About 1,200 yards west of

our position the leading enemy tanks, among them one heavy, had already crossed the

Arras-Beaumetz railway and shot up one of our Panzer IIIs. At the same time several

enemy tanks were advancing down the road from Bac du Nord and across the railway

line towards Wailly. It was an extremely tight spot, for there were also several enemy

tanks very close to Wailly on its northern side. The crew of a howitzer battery, some

distance away, now left their gun and swept along the retreating infantry. With Most’s

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