The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 7

command of the air forces would be to make senior air commanders fly on active operations. “For

every Air Vice Marshall lost, the RAF would save 200 air crews.”

This Jominian view of war has spilled over into the area of command and control, where it holds

that, despite the spread of military operations over wider and wider areas, advances in technology will

allow commanders to cope ever more effectively. Such views, despite the US failure in Vietnam, are

unfortunately still alive and well in the American military. The 1980 edition of US Air Force Manual 1-

1, the basic doctrinal manual of that service until 1984, suggested that the AWACS (Airborne Warning

and Control System), “allows commanders to comprehend the total air-surface battle.” This belief that

a centralised command and control system is the best approach to war is a basic theme in twentieth-

century military history. And for the most part its impact has been unfortunate, whether one recounts

military operations on the Somme in 1916 or in Market Garden in 1944.

Unfortunately, for their enemies, the Germans have generally avoided the Jominian view of

military operations in favour of the Clausewitzian one. Above all, On War raises the dark, bloody,

fearful qualities of combat:

We are not interested in generals who win victories without bloodshed. The fact that

slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us take war more seriously, but not provide an

excuse for gradually blunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or later someone will

come along with a sharp sword and hack off our arms.

Clausewitz’ depiction of war not only records its horror but notes the difficulties of acting and

thinking under such circumstances. In Chapter 4 of Book I he describes the movement of the novice

on to the battlefield. From the first terrifying sounds of battle to the “sight of men being killed and

mutilated”, Clausewitz sets out, in a brilliant and still-relevant passage, the fearful impressions that

assault the new recruit. “It is”, he tells us, “an exceptional man who keeps his powers of quick

decision intact if he has never been through this experience”. And while exposure to combat may

mitigate some of its impact, the ordinary man can never achieve a state of perfect unconcern in which

his mind can work with normal flexibility. Here again we recognize that ordinary qualities are not

enough … Headlong, dogged, or innate courage, overmastering ambition, or long familiarity with

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