The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 2

a deteriorating situation near Sedan were flatly ignored, until the pleas of front line officers

made them ‘wake up’ to reality; that the front had been broken.

Adaptability. On some occasions, Allied logistics (see Chapter 5) prevented a timely

deployment of forces. At the time when Allied reserves were deployed and on the move, the

Germans had already occupied the area in contention, gaining a defensive advantage. On

others, French columns of men and material on the move were surprised and subdued by

lightly armoured German reconnaissance forces.

The German forces showed greater adaptability, facilitated by tactical sensitivity (see

Chapter 4) and logistical independence (see Chapter 5). A common pattern emerged in this

campaign: one of quick action in line with tactical and operational necessities, but still in line

with strategic foresight. In essence, German planning allowed and encouraged forms of

improvisation, an extreme form of adaptability. Its purpose is to create and maintain

uncertainty and ambiguity for the enemy to such an extent that he is incapable of adapting to

circumstances.

[Text Box starts] Von Clausewitz and De Jomini: Strategy

1. Hypothetical combats should be judged just as if they were real, on the basis of their results.

If a detachment is sent away to cut off the retreat of a fleeing enemy, and the enemy therefore

surrenders without further resistance, it is the threat of combat offered by the pursuing

detachment that has forced this decision on him.

If a part of our Army occupies an undefended enemy province and thus deprives the enemy

of very considerable means of keeping up the strength of his Army, the threat of the battle

that would be necessary if the enemy attempted to recover the lost province is a deterrent

that enables us to keep it.

In both cases, therefore, the mere possibility of a battle has produced results, and so should

be classed as if it were a real event. Suppose that in these cases the enemy opposed our

troops with superior strength, and thus forced our armies to give up their object without

combat − then certainly our plan has failed, but that does not mean the resistance we offered

at (either of) those points has been without effect, because it drew the enemy’s forces to that

point. And if it becomes the case that our whole undertaking has done us harm, it cannot be

said that these positions, these possible battles, had no consequences; in such a situation,

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