The Need for Organisational Resilience - Chapter 7
In times of crises, adaptive innovation tends to come to a standstill as short-term
incremental changes are made to recover quickly from impending disaster. In other words,
organisations cannot afford lengthy periods of innovation when faced with imminent
catastrophe. Hence, only incremental changes may be carried out to avoid and reduce
operational downtime.
In this respect of being able to innovate, organisations require sufficient “space” (e.g.
time) to innovate, implement and operationalise innovations; this “space” (and the desire to
innovate) is what the Germans had between 1918 and 1940. Post 1940, the constant
pressure of the Allies stifled Germans’ ability to radically rethink their approach.
Thus, being stripped of “space” to innovate, the Germans could at least have
incrementally optimised their ways of working, adapting their approach to resilience to the
emerging threat at the western and eastern fronts (see Table 7.4).
At its best
Signs of weakness
Germany, post-1940
Performance improvement –
Lack of novel ideas on how to
Rigid thinking, driven by
“do what we do better”
“do better things”
“proven” methods applied
during the Polish and French
Known solutions are
Overconfidence in “best
campaign in 1939/1940.
implemented quickly – even by
practice; viewpoints of non-
edict
experts are excluded
A clear sense of direction,
People’s individual identities
goals, roles and responsibilities
and motives are at odds with
the organizational goals
A strong individual leader who
Lack of leadership at all levels;
people can relate to
lack of devolved ownership
and responsibility
Table 7.4: Performance optimisation: at its best; signs of weakness; Germany post-1940 (Adapted from Denyer 2017)
In technological terms, the Germans incrementally optimised their machines and
material, but gradually lost the advantage to the Russians and Western Allies. In 1940, their
doctrinal approach and technological advantage over the French were staggering. The
erosion of this advantage, though, was driven by an illusory overconfidence that what
worked in the past will work as well in the future. This rigidity in thinking came to a climax in
the Battle of the Bulge in 1944. The Allies innovated and optimised their doctrinal thinking,
the Germans did not; due to overconfidence in their capabilities and the lack of “space” that
would have allowed them to innovate and optimise.
The erosion of adaptive innovation and performance optimisation goes hand in hand
with an erosion of mindful action (see Table 7.5); the erosion of a single approach to
resilience tends not to happen in isolation but in conjunction with remaining approaches to
resilience.
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